

## Chapter Four

### Fictive History

#### *The Journals of Gabriel*

Below we see the introduction to the *Journals of Gabriel*, a series of thoughts which well displays Gabriel's state of mind before he began his descent into the maelstrom. He writes:

(I)nc., M. Gabriél, Alz physician, write to you now of the cause; a subject very dear to the hearts of my people, and of all people, yet from which we have become estranged. This exposition, these, my journals address a growing need to name this cause, to define its parameters, if only in our imagination of and steps toward it.

In our way of thinking the cause, like a thing we seek in darkness, is a most specific, yet unspecified, notion. Our inability to clearly express this notion, towards which we act and feel our humanity, leads us to shift our thinking to causes in general and their interaction vis-à-vis effects. This shift leads us to the notion of *causation* (the action of cause and effect), the theory of which we call *causality*. This exposition before you is a critique of causality and, more specifically, an attempt to define and specify the nature of *causality* as related to and by my people, the people of the old home.

In the study of "humanity," or the more preferable designation "mankind," it can hardly go unnoticed (at least by those like myself) that the notion of causation (or the activity of cause and effect themselves, if you wish) is an integral part not only of everyday life, but of the affairs of public health, jurisprudence, medicine and others throughout society. These forces would become quite useless should they no longer involve the activity of causation, and the determination of causality.

Note, however, the idea of usefulness inherent in this fact as well. It seems, on one hand, a necessary feature of causation and causality that they somehow be useful. It is in fact this usefulness which allows us to feel the cause *towards and from* which we strive. Thus, a critique of causality must confront and come to an understanding of the role of this usefulness above all else.

It is a particular feature of mankind, which (I)nc. have found being so long amongst them, that although causality rules their daily lives, their reflections of these lives seem to be missing, as mentioned above, from any notion of the cause itself. Those of them known as ethnologists, who study humanity, (a group with

which (I)nc. am identified while among them) seem to have no greater notion, or cannot express it, of what the cause they are committed to may be. They feel it, surely this is obvious, yet the utility which allows this, and justifies this cause remains unknown to them.

In my human schooling in the meaning of Pitrim Sorokin, learning its ways and the error of “my own.” But I will no longer, I can no longer abide by— that is, *live* by— either of these ways as they exist today. Look for me and “my own” in Sorokin’s scheme, for we are there. But what we ourselves see is not ourselves, for there we are but vehicles. Sorokin, like all humanists, has taken the silver from our mirror: “Physiochemical and purely biological phenomena,” he writes, “do not have the component of immaterial meanings.”

But avoid me, (I)nc. say, avoid these thoughts for they are a disease. Better the forest of philosophical anthropology where one meets inhumanity with knowing and familiar regard than the search for the name of pain, for the name of humanity.<sup>1</sup> It is my impulse to advise you to avoid magic at all costs if the pricing must be, as it today, anthropomorphic.<sup>2</sup> Yet we cannot ignore such an important key, this word “anthropomorphic,” (not to mention its political dimensions in relation to my people) for this notion seeks to disarm the cause, to point to the origin of (i.e. to name) the cause in a most profane, and (I)nc. dare say racist, way. The concepts of causality, it is said by those fringe elements among my own kind, lose their value precisely in the fact that they are anthropomorphic in origin. But are we not all mankind, do we not all partake in this form, even though we do not yet understand it, even though our extensive studies of it have become a foundation of its humanist edifice to which we occasionally offer blood? (I)nc. do not want to answer with “(I)nc. cannot say,” but (I)nc. cannot. Who cannot?

As (I)nc. read you reading me (I)nc. (*we*) cannot help but have the same feeling time and time-again. Is there something I(nc.) did, or failed to do, or a

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<sup>1</sup> Translator’s note: see H.G. Wells’ *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, a favorite book of Gabriel and a source through which I believe he ran many of his ideas.

<sup>2</sup> Translator’s note: Gabriel is referring here to a tradition of thinking about mimesis which bases itself in a certain primitivist view of the classical world in which Egyptian “magic” and “fetishism” are viewed within a frame of dominant heliocentrism. Gabriel suggests that this “anthropocentric view,” made famous in the Renaissance Hermeticism of Giordano Bruno, has worked in many ways to shape our current (mis-) understandings of sympathetic magic and memory. The key to this (mis-)understanding, according to Gabriel, is found in this philosophy’s implicit reliance on the notion of *sympatheia* as given to it by classical and scholastic Neoplatonism. Gabriel points in particular to Plato’s *Timeaus*, and even more to the work of Plotinus in which the universe is imagined as an organism in a sympathetic, affective, passionate and/or *possessive* relationship with the sun. Most particularly, Gabriel cites Plotinus’ notion that this sympathetic relation between the sun and the universe has its effect without having contact *via* any sort of medium. In this philosophy of magic, writes Gabriel, “Divinity or divinities were seen as being *in* things or bodies, from statues to human organs, and so on, but things or bodies were not themselves seen as mediums through which divinity informed one.” Nothing could be more opposed than this to the Stoic view in which the forms of body which constitute all things amount to an *anti-possessive sympatheia* (and philosophy of magic) in which, as Poseidonius describes it, the world is a living being in which things cohere by a unifying force within, by a force made up of different tensions (*tonos*) of *pneuma*.

way I(nc.) did things, or one particular thing, sometime before, which is in some way the cause? Of *what?* Oh, surely you jest! (I)nc. walk through this world as if encased in lead, having to lift each foot and place it before me as if in a slow march. You need me to dwell in your time and space, in your gravity and (I)nc., *we* do; though forgive me if (I)nc. only act sometimes. (I)nc., my (old) home, my people there, a *disease?* Well, if you say so. But let me be, let me say what (I)nc. do not want to say (I)nc. cannot. Hey, hey, hey, hey! *Oye! Que faltas?* What's the *matter?* I'll tell you, *the cause*, the cause is the matter. *La revolución vive en una suerte que no esta viviendo en muerte.*

Gabriel

Miami

### ***Reformation***

*The Journals of Gabriel* begin in Havana, immersed in (fictive) history. “In the seventeenth century there was a struggle,” writes Gabriel, “a struggle which still affects all of mankind to this day.” With the Christian reformation, beginning in Germany with Martin Luther, there also began a reformation of the inspirations and goals of scientific and medical practice. What we see is not an advancement in technology as much as advancement in theory which led to later social, political, and otherwise instrumental technologies. What we also see in this period, with the new, public growth of religion in these areas, says Gabriel, is *a reformation of magic*.<sup>1</sup> This reformation of magic is not that about which we have learned, i.e. the reformation of magic into the Alz mechanist, under which many of the Alz people still live, but rather a reformation of magic into the

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<sup>1</sup> This reformation of magic, again, according to Gabriel, mainly affected the hermetic conception of magic handed down from the Renaissance. As a “reformation” it reformed a mediums, heliocentric, Epicurean view of causality into a mediums, gravitational, (*Neo-*)*Platonized* Stoic view of causality (to be further addressed below). Here it is perhaps most important to note that Gabriel’s critique of the history of the Western philosophy of magic is also, inevitably, a critique of the way ethnology has traditionally understood the doctrine of sympathetic magic given to us by J.G. Frazer in *The Golden Bough*, ch.III.

Humanist Pietist under which humanity lives and supposedly flourishes. Gabriel does not say this directly, as he rarely says anything directly, but it becomes clear that his device of writing real history as fictional history directly implies such a view. Imagine a world, as reading these journals demands of us, in which mechanist medicine ruled the healing practices of our society; a world in which magical thinking and superstition held sway over one's inner relation to the spirit of the cause. If you are able to do this, and I do not expect many of us are, this section of the *Journals* would be easier to grasp.

Gabriel's history, which is one of seventeenth and eighteenth century origins of the colonial struggle, begins thus:

Originally one side was the Catholic Church, and the other the Protestants, but then came the various counter movements against the various established Protestant churches themselves.... These new reformers of Protestantism were labeled "Enthusiasts" by the leaders of the established Protestant churches, due to their emphasis on inner experience of the holy spirit, revelation, dreams, possession and so on (and on the systematization or doctrinal incorporation of this experience).

Before long, hard mechanists and semi-atheists were also using this term to describe those who opposed their own views.... What we see in the seminal scientific and medical theory of the seventeenth-century is a three sided struggle between the Enthusiasts on one side, the defenders of Doctrine on another, and the Alz (mechanist) philosophers on yet another. In this struggle the Christians always had the upper hand. Between themselves, and between themselves and their Alz (mechanist) opponents, it became fashionable and/or necessary for one to accuse the other of magic (or witchcraft). The Alz mechanists, on the other hand, for the most part, depicted their own mechanist "science" as a sort of barrier, a dike, which gave intellectual pursuits, and their rituals, power over enthusiastic religious 'conjurers and witches.'... Near the end of this century we see the rise of two forces—Pietism and the Enlightenment—one being a campaign against the Alz mechanist science, trying to pound a hole in this dike, and the other being a defense against this assault. Both of these forces, however, stood equally as strong against magical thinking.

It is crucial to note here the curious way in which Gabriel has put the relationship between Alz mechanism, Pietism and the Enlightenment. Again, he plays with what we know as if we do not know it. “Near the end of the [seventeenth] century we see two main forces,” he writes above, then he names them as Pietism and the Enlightenment, “one” being this and “the other” being that. But which is which? He does not say. The only clue he gives is in the next sentence where he tells us that *both* “stood equally as strong against magical thinking.” In this play of mystery we are given the possibility to suggest, to imagine, that the Enlightenment was *a defense of* the magical thinking of the Alz mechanists, instead of an assault upon it. Understand though that he does not *say* this; he simply implies it from the outset, from the point where I, the reader, realized that he was writing the *real* history of the successful Pietist struggle against Alz mechanism as if it were fictional. It is in times like this, while reading such passages, that I feel I never knew Gabriel, that I never knew who he was, or, rather, *what* he was. I know what he is now, of course, be not mistaken about that, but I am still not so sure about what I knew then.

Getting back to the point at hand, though, just imagine if Pietism had *not* been the course that the Enlightenment had taken against magic and superstition, but rather that Alz mechanism, the modern vehicle of magic and superstition itself, had been the course it took. This is the point which hit me and hit me hard. The waves in the wake of this impact you have already seen in my discussions of the colonization of the Alz people.<sup>1</sup> The colonization used to work in this way, as a struggle of one force against the other,

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<sup>1</sup> Note in particular Gabriel’s reaction to psychologist Leo Buscaglia and such discussions of “relationism,” quoted in the first chapter of this work, pp.22-24.

dialectically, religion needing magic, religion needing science, as antithesis needs thesis. What we have seen, slowly but surely over the last thirty years or so, however, is a greater balance of “acceptance” over “struggle;” a unity or syncretism where opposition once reigned.<sup>1</sup> What we see is a flattening out of this dialectic and/or a growing *harmonic refinement* or change of frequency within it. The colonizing forces of social work appear to work hand in hand with Alz mechanist medicine, accepting of it and offering it a means of sovereignty in a world which it has come to rule; offering it a way to “socialize.” Yet, as a product of 300 years of Pietist refinement and adaptation, it actually works to sublimate Alz mechanist medicine and the people it treats and to build a positive (and positivist) incorporation of the state in its work of synthesis.

Some may criticize me for my use of “Pietism” which I take from Gabriel. Some may say that this seemingly historical referent is too specific, too determinate to capture something so broad as a spirit of social work, or a spirit of socialization within a society such as this one. But what is that which opposes Alz mechanism; what is its name? How can one generalize so many (colonial) forces, so many ideas and philosophies? The name “Pietism,” as I use it, is not responsible for the generalization of these various forces—

rather, the state is. Whatever trends or movements which oppose the Alz mechanical, be

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<sup>1</sup> It must be noted here that a great deal of Gabriel’s *Journals* written while in Havana contain a specific implicit critique, *via* that of Pietism, of what he refers to as “Epicurean socialism.” According to Gabriel, there is a strong connection between Karl Marx’s youthful Epicureanism and the state of his people (see Marx’s secreted dissertation work entitled *Difference Between the Democritan and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* to which he refers in detail). In this work, Marx outlines a revision or, according to Gabriel, a *reformation*, of the Hegelian dialectic in which the progression in the freedom of self-consciousness from Stoicism to Skepticism to the unhappy consciousness is completed by an Epicurean (as opposed to Democritian) (atomist) materialism.

they: the organic, the chemical, the vital, the ecological, the primitive or what have you, all seem to be more like one, to be different representations of a unity, a means for pursuing a cause, *the cause*, which remains essentially and forever undefined in its opposition to the Alz mechanical. Gabriel and I call *this* cause “Pietism.” This is the first and last step toward naming *the cause*, yet only the first step, a negative, definitional step, *to naming the cause of Alzheimer’s disease*.

To get Gabriel’s point is to understand how the key is to separate the Alz mechanical from *the cause*, to denature that sly dialectic which sublates the Alz mechanical and preserves it for the systematicity of the state and its incorporation, the (I)nc. This is where Gabriel’s anti-colonial history begins.

### ***Pneumaticism and “The Symbol”***

In his *Journals* Gabriel, quite correctly, places great emphasis on what was known before and after the seventeenth-century, though in different ways, as “pneumatology.” Pneumatology is defined today as “the science of spiritual existence; the doctrine of the Holy Spirit;” or, more obscurely, as “psychology.” Most generally speaking, it is the study of *pneuma*, i.e. breath, spirit, or soul (akin to the Latin *spiritus*), which, as mentioned above, makes up the enduring core of Stoic philosophy from ancient Greece, through its (Neo-)Platonized versions, and into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Of this notion Gabriel writes:

To the Stoics the *pneuma*, or creative fire, was what they called the “*to hegemonikon*” or ruling part of the universe. Some Stoics took the sun to be the

*pneuma*, while other indicated its presence in a less specific fashion. This ruling spirit of the universe was associated with God in that to the Stoics Divinity was a unity around a certain principle, named many things and described in many ways, yet best described as “*tonos*” i.e. “strain, tension or tone.” This divinity was the great *cohesive* of the universe, of all (other) matter. The Stoics could easily express this divinity, a monism in contrast to Platonic dualism, in terms of equations like:

Divinity = Zeus = creative fire (*pneuma*) = ether = the word/speech (*logos*) = reason of the world = soul of the world = law of nature = providence = destiny = order.

To the Stoics, different degrees of being are defined by different degrees of *tonos*. The lowest levels of being have the least amount of *tonos* and the highest have the most. Examples of things from the lowest to the highest would be: rocks, then plants, then animals (things with a rudimentary soul), then “rational beings,” made up of man and Divinity—the most tense (*cohesive*) creative aspect of the universe. Man is the greatest expression of *tonos* on earth and Divinity the greatest expression of the heavens, i.e. the stars. Most important is the fact that throughout its history, from 300 BC to the eighteenth century, Stoicism was in a dialectical struggle against both Aristotelianism and Platonism, which it became infamous in its opposition to. In this particular dialectic Platonism (or Neoplatonism) has had the longest and most important influences on Stoicism, ever trying and often succeeding here or there to infuse its doctrine of Ideas into the Stoic concepts of *pneuma* and *tonos*. In the seventeenth century one can see both an ideal

(Neo-)Platonist Stoicism and a more original materialist Stoicism having their influences on the contemporary usage of the notions of *pneuma* and *tonos*.

Unlike materialist Stoicism with its monist tendencies and materialist origin the pneumatology of the Catholic Church and the major churches of the reformation was wholly dualist and Platonist. This, says Gabriel, was an important situation of affinity in that which was to follow. It was against the perceived Platonism of the Lutheran Doctrine that Pietism, under its founder Jacob Spener, made its first and foremost theological stand. According to this pneumatology, the dualism of body and soul was also a dualism, respectively, of the material and the immaterial or, in its Platonic aspect, the real and the ideal. The introspection and christological analysis of experience which Pietism encouraged in its adherents took the form of *linguistic reform*, of a rethinking of the Lutheran Doctrine which was in seventeenth and eighteenth century Germany referred to as the “*the Symbol*.”<sup>1</sup> The Lutheran Doctrine which Pietism addressed was itself, of course, also a doctrine of linguistic reform. The translation of the holy scriptures into German was accompanied by a great deal of exegesis and ground rules of interpreting the

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<sup>1</sup> For the influence of Platonizing figures, such as Plotinus and Philo Judeaus, in this historical regard see Andrew Weeks’ *German Mysticism: From Hildegard of Bingen to Ludwig Wittgenstein*.

various terms which one found in the German Bible not as one used them in their everyday senses, but in terms of “the Symbol.”<sup>1</sup>

It is also important, says Gabriel, to appreciate the intense commitment that many Enthusiasts among the Pietists had to missionary work. Beyond the extremism of figures like von Zinzendorf, who was the leader of the greatest missionary effort in all of Protestant history, we are told that another, possibly more important, side of Pietism existed. Quoting historian Andrew Weeks, Gabriel writes: “Pietist introspection was standardizing the life of the soul.”<sup>1</sup>

As mentioned above, Pietism’s main effect was to reform the linguistic and thereby reform the expressive abilities and habits of German thought, and especially pneumatology, in a new and supposedly more free systematization. With this, however, as Weeks tells us: “The systematization of inner life was depriving it of its aura of wonder. In an eighteenth-century Pietism that had taken a firm stand against reason and science, inner experience and knowledge of nature were to become quaint curiosities. In the eighteenth-century Pietism of Zinzendorf..., nature mysticism reemerged as a rebellion against reason.” These aspects of nature mysticism (which forever goes hand in hand with colonialism, just think my interview with Carmen), a standardization of the life of the soul, and *the linguistic/experiential systematization of inner life*, played a leading role in what came to be enduring forces in support of “the Enlightenment”—by which I mean “colonialist mechanism”—still working today.

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<sup>1</sup> Translator’s note: This definition of the symbol is a crucial one for the implicit critique carried out in this work as a whole and this must be so borne in mind.

### *Iatro-animism*

“Before we consider these aspects of colonial domination, however,” writes Gabriel “it would be best to consider a bit of background to them as seen in the medical philosophy of the seventeenth-century.” One of the great theoretic innovators of this period, Hermann Boerhaave, here also quoted by Gabriel, wrote:

Every vital action depends on certain bodily conditions and relations; every change in these bodily conditions and relations is necessarily followed by a corresponding change in vital activity; medicine, therefore, must be based on physiology.

It is here, on the subject of relations, that Gabriel begins the most dense part of his journals. He writes:

The great question which such statements seemed to engender—a question which saw a great deal of debate at the time, in the *origin* of the conquest against me and my own—was what, exactly, the “nature” of these “conditions” and “relations” was. In response to this question two opposing schools emerged, one the “iatrochemists” i.e. “chemical physicians” and the other the “iatrophysicists” or “iatromathematicians” i.e. “mechanical (physical) or mathematical physicians.” The iatrochemists thought the nature of these conditions and relations within the body to be of the nature of chemical relations as they understood them at the time (thus very much alchemically) and the iatrophysicists understood them to be of the nature of physical and mathematical relations. For the most part their theory was just that, theory, and had little effect on the remedies they used, these remedies often being the same since Roman times. At that time the divide between our own and humanist forms of medical practice did not exist *per se*. The divide was not so much about the *effectiveness*, or “naturalness” of this or that drug, as we see today, but rather about *how* these drugs had their effects. The iatrochemists thought of chemical effects of and on chemicals, thus of bonding and separating effects on bodily chemical spirits, and the iatrophysicists thought of physical effects on and of physical things/spirits.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

Throughout most of the history of dualist pneumatology, Gabriel explains, this or that form of vitalist (I would say “activist”) thought has held sway. It was thought, in these many times and places, that a certain “life spirit” existed which was infused in all “living” bodies. There was also often a certain notion among many that matter itself was somehow intelligent, somehow knowing where to go, or how to move, when this or that happened. “You must understand,” says Gabriel, commenting on this notion, “that my people have traditionally considered animism to be a mark of the primitive, and thus regarded it in the way we would regard primitives.” He then continues:

I call this vitalist regard “animist” because, properly speaking, it relies upon a system of thought which has become philosophized or enculturated amongst humanity. Essentially, as I have only come to realize from my recent experience, the notion of animism is a result of a certain primitivist view of other forms of thought, spatially and temporally, which seem to display what ethnologist Lévy-Bruhl refers to as a different logic or mentality than that of one’s own contemporary forms of description and determination. Whether we are considering the Greek (Stoic) *pneuma* or the Latin *spiritus* (its translation) we see an “animist” notion *historically* which is or was a way of regarding things which we have progressed beyond.

Gabriel then moves, seemingly apropos, to the subject of alchemy, writing:

For the alchemists nature was to be understood through chemistry and chemical analogy. The “life spirit” was something which could actually be obtained through distillation, this spirit being the lightest fraction of a distillation process. The greatest alchemist of the sixteenth century and the great forefather of the iatrochemists was Paracelsus. Admittedly influenced by Stoic thought (as well as Platonic/Scholastic ideas), Paracelsus made a science of the cosmos out of the tradition of medical thought passed down from Greek and Roman physicians like Hippocrates and Galen. It would be a great mistake, though, when considering the work of the seventeenth century iatrochemists, to regard their work as akin to the technical epistemologies and methods we find today in the syncretic fusion between Alz mechanism and Pietist science. Theirs, like that of Paracelsus, was rather a “spiritual” pursuit of sorts, a quest to define and refine or distill life spirit and, in doing so, greater understand the healing powers which God had laid in nature.

The key in iatrochemistry, Gabriel tells us, was to find the bonds and affinities *between the spirits of things* (including plants, and minerals) which were extracted through distillation and were known as “chemicals.” When it came to animals and man, the iatrochemist searched for the bonds and affinities between spirits which the body itself distilled. These spirits were known from Roman times to be various, but the most important among them to the life of a human being were what they called “animal” spirits. Alz and humanist historians of this period, and of iatrochemistry in particular, are, however, quick to warn that these “animal” spirits are not “spirits of animals” but rather “animal” in the sense of *anima*, i.e. those spirits which provide animation to the body. Historians sometimes use the term “animist” to describe this view and those who were later influenced by it.

Gabriel then goes on to describe the ways in which the notions of *pneuma* and animal spirits came to be refined and defined in iatrochemistry. He writes:

Through heating, thought the iatrochemist J.B. van Helmont—echoing the Stoic notion of divinity as creative power or fire—spirits or souls could be released from their material bodies to roam free in gaseous form. The inventor of the term “gas,” van Helmont thought of all gas as living, pure, or purer spirit. These spirits, among them air, surrounded one, one breathed them, moved through them and was moved by them. This was the dominant mode of iatrochemical thought for over one hundred years until Lavoisier’s introduction of “oxygen” and other elements into the descriptive scheme. The great question was still, of course, of what nature these spirits were.

In his illuminative essay “The matter of souls: medical theory and theology in seventeenth-century England” the historian John Henry describes the impact this sort of medical theory had on the theology of the time. Foremost among the theologians who

saw a great threat in these medically inspired revisions of Platonic dualist pneumatology were Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, two among a group known as the “Cambridge Platonists.” The goal of More and Cudworth’s philosophy was to resist a voluntarist pneumatology in which matter was imbued with a spirit which was the will of God. In response to such a view, writes Henry, “More and Cudworth wanted to establish the claim that even God’s activities are constrained by ‘mutual Respects and Relations eternal and immutable, and in order of Nature antecedent to any Understanding either created or uncreated’” According to More and Cudworth, certain “immutable Respects and Relations,” i.e. between matter and immaterial spirit, are the primary categories of God’s thought, and therefore of all ideas. But the great tendency in most all medical theory of the seventeenth-century, explains Gabriel, was against such a strict dichotomy between matter and immaterial spirit and more towards the “spiritualization” or idealization of matter. He writes:

It is in the notion of the material *pneuma*, and in the rejection of Platonism, that we see the Alz mechanism of the iatrophysicists and the chemistry (or chemistrism) of the iatrochemists come into close proximity. Both philosophies, or cultures, for the most part, agreed on the materiality of the animal spirits, but disagreed on how they operated within the body. For the iatrochemists the *activity* of these spirits, their vitality, became a sort of organizing principle, while for the iatrophysicists they became simply the basis for physical causal interaction.

### *Organicism and/or Platonist Sympatheia*

This proximity between the Alz mechanists and the iatrochemists (the two great lines of species determination which we now recognize as “mankind”) did not, as we know, endure. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, writes Gabriel, the German Pietist medical philosopher, and iatrochemist descendent G.E. Stahl would found a

vitalist philosophy of the “organism” which depicted an *organizing principle of* inert material animal spirits as the proper source of studying what we now think of as “diseases.” Instead of separating the soul from the body, as contemporary pneumatologists were still doing, he separated the organizing principle of the body, from that which did not include the organizing principle, i.e. inert matter. To Stahl the soul became the active life of the body, not faculties, or abilities but that which made these faculties and abilities realizable. With this deemphasis on the primacy of sense and “rational faculties,” thought Stahl, came a shift of the emphasis from the thinking rational soul to the feeling, spiritual soul. To Stahl, writes historian Johanna Geyer-Kordesch:

The passions and the imagination are much more vital in assessing the condition of a man or woman than any purely somatic approach. Moreover, the passions and imagination make havoc of any conceptions of cause and effect on mechanical (somatic) lines and their influence is much more powerful than reason.<sup>1</sup>

To Stahl, “feeling” was of great importance, one’s soul and body were known through knowing one’s *feelings*. This is the soul and body of the ‘psychosomatic’ and also that of the faith healer. Stahl’s greatest fear, and that which his philosophy was in reaction to, was, according to Geyer-Kordesch, “the ‘naturalization of all things’ and removing in this secularization, the soul from all things.” According to Stahl, writes Geyer-Kordesch:

‘To be guided from the visible to the unseen’ has a direct bearing on the emotions and imagination.... Both emotions and imagination can be induced, through an ‘object’ seen or envisioned. Their effect is palpable. Perception *always* has a bodily component. In this process the soul ‘constructs’ or ‘forms’ the body. In this system one cannot ‘objectify’ the mechanics, of, say, love, hate, envy,

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<sup>1</sup> Geyer-Korsesch, Johanna in French, Roger and Wear, Andrew *The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*, p.163.

sadness, fear, because to taste and see the outer skin *and* core (body and soul) predicates the subjective. Perception has no other agent than the soul. And the soul is organic, that is, it is bound to individuation, setting thereby a boundary not between spirit and matter, but between perception (in living beings) and inorganic matter.<sup>1</sup>

A human heart would, says Stahl, continue beating when removed from the body, but it would not, no longer being a part of the organism, beat any faster for love.

Likewise, when we are embarrassed, when someone has exposed a secret about our inner selves, we may look away, our heart may beat faster and we may perspire more, all of which indicate, according to Stahl's conception, the presence of the organic soul. It is with

such a conception that Stahl was able to make a strong link between the outward symptom, and the inner goings on. "This view that the seen and unseen are inseparable but invisible through symptoms ('signs')," writes Geyer-Kordesch, "led to an observational healing method (the 'natural' or 'Stahlian' method') and forms the basis of a psychosomatic approach to disease."

Strangely, and here I think Gabriel must be taking more liberties than he should, he quotes Geyer-Kordesch as if she were in agreement with his own fictional history. "In commenting on the Stahlian method of psychosomatic medicine," says Gabriel, "she writes:

Had the political appeal of the mechanical philosophy not been so strong and the proponents of Stahl's medicine not been religious enthusiasts, who seemed so

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p.162

disquieting to a hierarchical order, medicine today might have a different theoretical foundation.<sup>1</sup>

Among the Pietist reactionaries against Lutheran doctrine in Germany Stahl was considered, like most Pietists, as something of an Enthusiast. In Stahl's work we see one of the first strong and, I argue, crucial historical links between the systematization of the inner world spirituality found in Enthusiast movements and the spirits of the iatrochemical. This link, which has survived to this day, could also be described as a link between the organismic, or bio-chemical and the state; a link between the social group of spiritual explorers, critics and allies as seen in Pietism and the (I)nc., on one hand, and the scene of the bio-chemical medicine on the other.

The Pietists, our forefathers, according to Geyer-Kordesch, saw themselves as an inspired community of a few. They demonstrated their 'unworldliness,' says Geyer-Kordesch, "by behavior disruptive of social norms (marriage across class lines, preaching against court immorality, associating freely with the unlearned and the poor, disregarding leisure, games, theater, clothes and other pleasures)." They were not interested in the objective nature of science and the methods of rationality which accompanied it, but rather in "a method of interpreting nature of necessity." The Pietists and most other Enthusiasts of this time were bent on a campaign against both rationalism, which they countered with inspiration and its systematization in reinterpretation of "the Symbol," and dualism, which they countered with the "spiritualization" of all. With the theory of Stahl, says Geyer-Kordesch, "A very different psychology, physiology and pathology

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p.163.

developed.” In a description of Stahl’s theory, which could easily be a description of social work, she tells us that it “takes up the main tenets of enthusiast thought, but also claims to be in accord with the latest scientific knowledge.”

### *Pietist Mechanism*

To Gabriel, Stahl was indeed the first step towards the colonial mind-set as he now saw it. “From this point,” says Gabriel, “the seed was planted which grew into the world as I, and my people, find it today.” Following his discussion of Stahl he discusses the refinements of one Friedrich Hoffman which set Stahl’s organismic ideas in enduring motion. He writes:

Friedrich Hoffman, a Pietist, though somewhat less enthusiastic, colleague of Stahl, described this organismic movement in terms derived from and displaying its connection to Stoicism. Brian Inglis, a historian of this period, tells us that Hoffman agreed with Stahl that the organismic life force (principle) kept the body in a state of equilibrium called “health,” but he also felt “that this was not a negative state: the force was a ‘*tonus*,’ which needed to be kept up to the mark, and although there might be occasions when illness arose out of an excess of *tonus*, much more commonly it was caused by a deficiency—in which case a ‘tonic’ was needed.”<sup>1</sup> In Stahl’s formulation and, more importantly, in Hoffman’s mechanist refinement of it, we see a conception of the human body which is wholly chemical, or iatrochemical, yet appears to have taken on a physicality seemingly akin to that of the iatrophysicists.

It is in this strange, seeming affinity that bio-medicine still lives and, under the influence of a revival of Pietism, it is in this seeming affinity that, as I intend to show in the case of Alzheimer’s disease, it founders.

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<sup>1</sup> Here we see quite clearly the mixing of a Neoplatonic, Newtonian Stoicism with chemical philosophy. Organicism, i.e. the idea that divine spirit resides *in* bodies, and is not a medium of the physical contact of divinity and bodies, cannot help but be part and parcel to this form of Neoplatonism and/or Stoicism.

It is possible, as Gabriel does, to depict Hoffman's mechanist revision of Stahl's Aristotelian, animist doctrine as a dialectical sublation which negates *and* preserves both the iatrochemical vision of Stahl and his Enthusiast spirit. This spirit, argues Gabriel, contains within it "the seed" of modern medical science. In considering Hoffman's self-declared "mechanist" orientation, an ur-form of primitivism, it is important to note, as Roger French tells us:

By *mechanismus* Hoffman meant at its simplest natural necessity: when fire is applied to wood, the wood necessarily burns. When a complex of such causes produces effects that are purposeful, this for Hoffman is also mechanism, but more perfect.... *Organismus* was no more than other people's term for such a mechanism within organic bodies. The true opposite of *mechanismus* for Hoffman was *moralismus*, actions proceeding from the will. Indeed, it is often a mistake to translate *mechanismus*, as used by Hoffman and his contemporaries, as 'mechanism,' and a worse mistake to infer in the absence of the term that they meant 'machine-like'. 'Natural necessity' would be a better translation.<sup>1</sup>

Of this key, primitivist appropriation, redefinition and syncretization of Alz mechanism by iatrochemistry and Pietism Gabriel writes:

In his dialectical subversion of Stahl's *organismus* Hoffman creates a new, primitivist, mechanist philosophy or medicine, a thoroughly enlightened theoretical orientation, which carries Pietist philosophy into cooperation with the Enlightenment itself. As historian Roger French puts it, to Hoffman: "The cure of the body and the 'cure of souls' are the same kind of activity (*salus* is equally 'health' and 'salvation'). Both medicine and theology are theoretical and practical; the theologian's theory is the revealed word and that of the physician is the laws of nature, or in Hoffman's terms, mechanism" [i.e. necessity]. This comparison does show, as Michel Foucault correctly points out, that the "the laws of nature" were (and somehow still are) thought to have some sort of successive relation to the revealed word. It is also true that an enterprise of knowledge about the "secrets" of the human body, and a vocabulary and grammar oriented towards disease, begin at this time to be built thereupon. More importantly, however, it shows a crises in the philosophy of mechanism which arose in the Enlightenment and was resolved in a way in which Alz mechanism succumbed, despite the Pietist intentions of Hoffman, to a *form of animism*.

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<sup>1</sup> French, Roger "Sickness and the Soul" in Cunningham, A. and French R. *The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century*, p.96.

Another popular way to describe this turn which Gabriel points to here would be from machine to animist necessity; that the mechanistic pathology of *physical* structure, and of relating disease to physical structure, gave way to a mechanistic pathology of *metaphorical* or *analogical* structure. With Stahl's organism, though sublated by those like Hoffman, came the notion of illness as a diminution of "spirit" creating metaphorical possibilities heretofore thought to be outside of reason. "Spirit" now could equally be "gusto," "fortitude," or "inspiration" as it could be chemical or tonic. This mechanistic pathology of metaphorical or analogical structure was also in a certain sense a revival of Renaissance naturalism, infused with all of its qualities of spleen, bile, melancholy, and so on, yet begging for a new organismic classification. As Roger French writes about this turn: "The result was that while the ['Alz'] 'mechanist' had a ready-made 'map' of the body in which to locate his knowledge of diseases, the 'animist' [i.e. primitivist mechanist] had none. He had to classify his diseases in a different way. [T]his helps to explain why one of the best known animists of the eighteenth century [Johannes de Gorter] was also the first great nosologist" [my brackets]. What followed, according to French, was long battle within the eighteenth century between animist mechanist pathologists who practiced nosology and those Alz mechanist pathologists who continued to study "pulleys and levers;" a battle which, of course, the nosologists won. The result of this *most crucial* victory of nosology, led by Sauvages, was the death of the notion of cause in medical thinking, or rather, the sublation and preservation of cause in the form of *salus*, i.e. health *and* salvation incorporated and directed by the state. Physical cause

(of physics) was given up for *the cause*, and the *dialectical* “I” of the ill person *and* doctor was given up for the (I)nc. of social work.

It is following this that Gabriel seems to digress a bit, urging that it is most important that we fully understand the link between Hoffman’s theory and those visions most treasured by the Enlightenment. This can be done, he says, in a comparison of Hoffman’s thought to that of the great deity of the Enlightenment himself—Sir Isaac Newton. The chief problem Hoffman saw in the theory of Stahl, says Gabriel, was Stahl’s assertion that matter was inert and that motion was separate from matter itself (due to its direction by a life force of the organism). Hoffman, a man who so wanted to make Pietism more palatable to science, and visa-versa, thought that Stahl’s idea of inert matter denied spiritual action in corporeal bodies (so important to Pietism) and thus seemed (no less) to approach atheism in ways which Stahl had never expected. In response to this interpretation of Stahl, writes Roger French:

Hoffman insisted that God in making the world had created corporeal bodies external to himself, together with *motion*, which was neither material or immaterial, but simply *the operation of things*. God gave to all matter a power of motion or resistance whereby all bodies interact, move and produce all the qualitative aspects of existence and life itself. All action is by contact and the ways that bodies interact are simply God’s natural laws, the Will of the Creator remaining in things since the creation [my italics].<sup>1</sup>

Of this notion of “will,” so important to their Pietist cause, Gabriel writes:

In Hoffman’s critique of Stahl we see as well the crucial distinction, mentioned above in a different context, between the revealed word of the theologian and the natural law of the physician. The key *here*, though, does not concern the linguistic, symbolic, semiotic word of Foucault’s “*order of things*” but rather the world of willful creation which Hoffman calls “the *operation* of things” or “the

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p.95.

spiritual action of corporeal bodies.” This thought of Hoffman is a conception *prior to* that of Sauvages and his animist nosology. In it we see a focus on creation, the ascription of all laws of nature to an originary act, design or intention of the creator. For Hoffman it was not a description of static relations, an order, which defined the body and illness, nor was this order captured in the a doctrine of linguistic usage of “practice” (leading to experience), as Luther, the theologian, thought he had done with the word of God in “the Symbol.” Illness and the body, like all matter and its states, was *experienced and known in spiritual movement*, in its operation, and its structure was how its material stayed or did not stay together in this movement and/or operation. Matter or “body” was known as God was known, i.e. as the organizing principle of life in accord with which one should live (in piety). The mechanism of both Hoffman and Newton is construed as the necessities which the operation of a given system make necessary according to an organizing principle. In the thought of Newton this organizing principle was God, while in the thought of Hoffman it was created by God. In both “the Symbol” became the accurate mapping of this organizing principle.

It is here, writes Gabriel, that the colonial wars have their true beginning. At this point Alz Mechanist philosophy and culture begins to be absorbed into, syncretized with, that of humanity. The theories of Hoffman, Newton, and those like them become a collective manifesto of sorts for those who wish to proceed with the Enlightenment, yet do not themselves wish to become enlightened. If the deification of Newton, especially among humanist and socialist utopians, shows anything significant, says Gabriel, then it shows us this. Concern with “the Symbol,” whether in Newton’s calculus, Hoffman’s Pietist mechanism, or Voltaire and Rousseau’s writings, dialectically becomes *that which captures and directs change*. The results of this transformation of “the Symbol” seen in the structural, mechanical and above all spiritual and natural senses it assumed, not only laid the groundwork for the modern state’s appropriation of the Enlightenment but also,

one could say, for the definition of “mass” no longer as just an inert physical, but now also as a living social, aggregate.<sup>1</sup>

Gabriel does not, however, leave this idea alone. Another way of describing these changes, he then says, would be in terms of “materialism.” What we see in Newton, Hoffman, et al. is an assumption of mechanism without materialism. Instead of a focus upon matter itself, which was quite difficult and fraught with turmoil as the preceding century’s debates had made obvious, one could focus upon the *operation* of matter, on its changes and *relations between* its different *forms*. “Life” itself became less of a focus and life *change* became more. But this life change became a mathematical and classificatory scheme of determining active relations. Pietism’s systematization of inner experience and language had come, by the age of Romanticism, to only be expressible in terms of nature, especially *human* nature and the language of “phenomena.” The notion of causality in this scheme came to be seen in terms of natural necessity and a cartography of animist forces.

Most important, however, is the fact that the systematization of inner experience and language discussed here displays within it a quite different notion of the dialectic than that seen in Baroque figures such as Descartes. In the era of Hoffman and Newton, as in all times before and hence, there is a definite link between the inner experience and language of the thinker and the writer, his or her inspirations and motivations, and the

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<sup>1</sup> This aggregate could be defined as hygiene and/or the organizing principle of the social body, contra contagion by means of taboo, which we refer to as the sacred.

way, the method, in which he or she reasons in (and outside of) writing. In comparing the method of Descartes to that of Hoffman or Newton one finds an example of the key shift from material to form, from cause and effect to systematic operation, and from dialogue to systematic description which made these methods so qualitatively different.

In Newton's early career, for some twenty years, he was a wholehearted disciple of Descartes. As a picture of the young Newton's mind-set historian B.J.T. Dobbs gives us a description of Descartes which is meant to contrast with the thought which Newton later established as a method. In this description, which Gabriel quotes, she writes:

Descartes was determined to exclude all occult principles from his philosophy, as is well known, and that included the apparent "attraction" of gravity, as well as the shaping spirits, souls, forms and active principles of Peripatetics, Stoics, and alchemists. Descartes's physics was impact physics: Motion could be transferred from one body to another only by mechanical impact or pressure. Hence the postulate of a gravitational aether that *pushed* heavy bodies toward the earth, that *pushed* the planets around the sun, in much the same way that chips of wood may be swirled about the center in a whirlpool of water.<sup>1</sup>

This explanation of gravity and these tenets were held by the young Newton as well. As his studies progressed, however, Newton came to reject this ethereal view of impact causation and to look for a new causal principle for gravitation which in some way could still be mechanical. Dobbs tells us that "Newton was dismayed by the fact that a combination of mathematics, observation and experimentation had forced him to abandon the mechanical causal principle he had accepted for so long." In place of this mechanical notion of causality Newton worked with a notion of necessity and/or determination. As historian Gerd Buchdahl tells us, in this method:

Newton need not specify, of course, in what way the central and revolving bodies are, if at all, causally concerned in the total situation; nor does he need to introduce any third element, for instance, a medium such as is represented by the ether. He may in fact just want to say, as in Mach's later formulation, that the existence of the two masses is *determinative* of certain accelerations in revolving bodies; "determination" being the most neutral locution possible for a causal state of affairs, and compatible with post-Newtonian theory which includes considerations of variations in the metric of "space" in the neighborhood of "matter"; compatible even with an abandonment of any straightforward notion of "cause."<sup>2</sup>

In his analysis of this move away from any direct notion of cause to one of diagrams and plotted forces of guiding spirits and principles Gabriel tells us:

Newton's method, like Hoffman's, was that of using "the Symbol" of the reformation's post-Platonism and mechanism against itself, it being built, like the Lutheran "Symbol," against scholastic theology and, in particular, its pneumatology. Newton understood very well from where these ideas he used had come and what they implied pneumatically and theologically. Unlike Newton's method, modern Pietist science has come to see, or at least tries to see, itself as detached from such a negative history of "symbolic" revision, concerned with "nature" rather than "divinity," and well within a positivist framework which is beyond such practices. Newton is imagined as the pure thinker of the new system of truth, mathematics, the calculus, and his quests for the nature of divinity are written off in various ways as being irrelevant to the nature of his inventions and gifts to modernity. But behind Newton's sublation of Cartesian physics, Alz mechanism, and iatrochemistry, like Stahl and Hoffman, the notion of the organizing principle of alchemy survived as thesis survives in its synthesis with its antithesis, i.e. actively and historically. Newton wanted to turn the clock back on the influence of Paracelsus, Descartes, et al.; he wanted to go back to that which inspired them, and rethink it. Dobbs tells us that "Newton had always accepted the Renaissance view of history as a decline from the original golden age, a time in which there existed an original pure knowledge of things both natural and super-natural, an ancient wisdom subsequently lost or garbled through human sin and error and through temporal decay." In essence, Newton, like Stahl and Hoffman, sought to recapture an active animist understanding, *in the Symbol*, of nature, spirit, God; to "be one" with nature, to *feel* it, and to build a pious science thereupon. To do this, argues Dobbs, Newton turned to the Stoics.

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<sup>1</sup> Dobbs, B.J.T. "Stoic and Epicurean Doctrines in Newton" in Osler, Margaret J. *Atoms, Pneuma and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought*, p.227.

<sup>2</sup> Buchdahl, Gerd "Gravity and Intelligibility: Newton to Kant" in Butts, R.E. and Davis, J.W. *The Methodological Heritage of Newton*, p.79.

Within the Stoic view of the universe we can see how Newton would have found a model for his historical animist project to discover the ur-cohesive and ur-active principle of the cosmos. The Stoics, if you will remember, could be said to have worked with the following formulation: Divinity = Zeus = creative fire (*pneuma*) = ether = the word (logos) = reason of the world = soul of the world = law of nature = providence = destiny = order. This, one could say, is exactly what Newton wanted when he sought an ur-animist view or theology/physics which encompassed ancient alchemists, Paracelsus, and Descartes. His problem, if you will remember, was how to formulate a theory of gravitation without occultation *and* without the ethereal *push* of Descartes. His problem was also how to work against “the Symbol” of anti-Platonism and Scholasticism, while preserving, as did his colleagues the Cambridge Platonists More and Cudworth, the ‘mutual Respects and Relations eternal and immutable, and in the order of nature antecedent to any Understanding either created or uncreated’ (i.e. Edenic and/or animist). This Stoic equation possessed the possibility to achieve each of these goals. He needed to know and express divinity; he had this. He needed to include the truths of alchemy, i.e. his *active principle*, which he had in the “creative fire.” He needed an ether which was not the ether of Descartes; he had *it*. He needed to reconcile mathematical and linguistic expression with the physical, and he needed to deal with the word of God, which “the word (logos)” gave him too. He wanted a theory of organicity, which he thought key to all his theories according to Dobbs, and he got *it*. Finally, laws, necessity, providence, destiny and order he too received *all in one*.

The biggest problem in all of this for Newton, explains Gabriel quite correctly, was the reconciliation of his own theory with ether—the spirit of Descartes’ physics which haunted him. As you may remember, the original Stoic conception of *pneuma* (i.e. ether) was that it was *material*. The problem Newton encountered, to de-materialize this *pneuma*, is portrayed by Dobbs thus:

[T]he cosmic *pneuma*, as active principle, permeated and blended completely with the body (conceived as passive principle), and the tensional powers of the *pneuma* held the body together. Stoic insistence upon the corporeality of the cosmic divine *pneuma* had always made the Stoic theory of total blending somewhat problematic. Are corporeal *pneuma* and the corporeal body to fuse completely, and so become something that is neither God nor matter? Are two corporeal bodies to occupy the same space at the same time? The original Stoic arguments on blending seem to have more or less avoided those issues by the treating *pneuma* in its motion through matter, as a shaping, cohesive force, but another solution to the difficulty was to create a Platonizing Stoicism in which the

corporeal (but active and divine) Stoic *pneuma* was made spiritual and incorporeal but still mingled and blended with every body. That was the solution chosen by Philo,<sup>1</sup> by many of the church fathers, and by the prominent sixteenth century renaissance Stoic Justus Lipsius. It was also the solution Newton needed.<sup>2</sup>

In carrying out his solution, Dobbs explains, Newton needed to fit this form of Stoicism into his theorization of gravitation. She writes:

The tenor of Philonic Stoicism was to shift from a materialistic monism toward a Platonic dualism, within which there existed a distinction between spirit and matter that was quite foreign to most of the ancient Stoics. Under the dispensation of a Platonizing Stoicism, with its incorporeal deity as the active principle, Newton was able to use the Stoic concept of the deity as a tensional force, binding the parts of the cosmos together, penetrating and mingling with all bodies, and that without the inconveniences attendant upon the corporeal *pneuma* or aether.

In the matter of gravity, Newton had recognized that no material, mechanical cause would serve and had been forced to make a break with corporeal causality. The evidence he had in hand denied the presence of the corporeal aether, yet gravity acted, and it seemed to act as if it penetrated to the very centers of bodies. Only spirit could penetrate in that way without constituting a frictional drag by acting on the surfaces of bodies and/or on the surfaces of their internal parts. In the context of Stoic thought, as interpreted by Philo and Lipsius, the all-pervasive spirit was the active principle, acting everywhere to penetrate and bind the active principle, as subsumed by the literal omnipresence of God, as a spiritual force binding all together, was to serve Newton for many years. Stoic the idea was, certainly, but Newton used it in its Platonizing version, in which the deity was wholly immaterial, noncorporeal, yet all-pervasive.<sup>1</sup>

With this, says Gabriel, Newton, like Hoffman, was able to reinvent mechanism in a way in which it became compatible with both Enlightenment rationalism and Christian spiritualism and was able to provide for that which Hoffman found most important to the preservation of Pietism in all scientific discourse—spiritual action in

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<sup>1</sup> Philo Judaeus, a.k.a. Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 B.C.- 40 A.D.)

<sup>2</sup> Dobbs, B.J.T. Ibid. pp.236-237.

corporeal bodies. In Hoffman's case, in making Stahl's organicism safe for modernity, an animist spirit of exploration of the body and disease was founded which was first taken up by nosology and later by nineteenth century biological and philosophical theory and practice. The move from materialist mechanism to a systematic mechanism of an organizing principle became wholly accepted by the Enlightenment, made a part of its doctrines of mind, spirit, and mankind and, in turn, this move made the deification of Newton, as its greatest expression of this mind, spirit and mankind, almost necessary.

This particular link can also be expressed otherwise, Gabriel tells us. Quoting historian Robert M. Bigler's account of the politics of German Protestantism. "The Pietists," says Bigler, "certainly had no intention of furthering the *Aufklärung*. Their basic preoccupation with the problems of sin and personal salvation was alien to modernity." Following this remark, which Gabriel finds to be "a perfect expression of humanist self-deception," Bigler writes:

Yet there were tendencies in Pietism which helped pave the way for the *Aufklärung*. The stress upon personal experience in religion made dogmatic differences appear unimportant. (The *Aufklärung* regarded such differences as ridiculous.) The direct contact between the Pietist and his God de-emphasized the role of the officially ordained clergy. (*Aufklärung* thinkers often declared the clergy to be positively harmful.) The religious individualism of Pietism showed some external similarity to the "autonomous man" (idealized by the *Aufklärung*) who was freed from traditional corporate ties, whether secular or ecclesiastical. Because of their principles of respect for religious individuality and their situation as a barely tolerated religious minority, the Pietists were, moreover, firm champions of religious tolerance.... Eventually, Pietist uprightness could be stripped of its religiousness and become fused with a rational utilitarianism which related the good to the useful.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p.237.

<sup>2</sup> Bigler, Robert M. *The Politics of German Protestantism*, p.13.

But to this latter part, regarding the confluences of Pietism and the Enlightenment, is responded to by Gabriel with a guarded tone. He writes:

True as it is that these, and other, particular confluences existed between the Enlightenment and Pietism, it is also important to never forget that in their stand against “magic and superstition” they both stand against Alz mechanism. As a result of this determination, and the subsequent colonial wars against my people and our ways, we end up today with the situation as it stands, the Alz people needing ever more money and liberty to heal themselves and others, and humanity secretly providing for and fighting against this struggle. In the end, it all comes down to negativity, the Alz physicians negating the Pietist physicians and the Pietist depending upon this negation for their own self-recognition. I stand outside of this history and outside of its incorporation, my negativity remaining, but crying out to no longer be, unemployed. Between the mechanism of my people and that which you know among humanity stands the notion of, the need for, a non-idealistic materialism. The problem to be overcome is the “organizing principle” with which I, we, you dialectically struggle. I stand by the old wisdom, which has long since been forgotten but remains true that neither gravity nor body are created by God, nor are they God but, rather, both create each other, and are each other.